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I. INTRODUCTION

This topic was last surveyed in 1996 by Rohan Kelley.' Although this
survey does include some material from late 1996, its main focus is on cases,
statutes, and rules from 1997 through the middle of 1998.
Once again, attorneys' fees and creditors' claims lead the list of the
most active topics. There was also a substantial amount of activity in the
homestead area. In addition, two 1998 cases on Florida's deadman's
statute,2 demonstrate the need for a legislative reform of this arcane statute.
Recent legislation and rule changes are addressed in separate sections. While the authors elected to discuss some of these changes in detail,
the majority of the changes are covered in a summary fashion. Finally, there
were a number of cases worthy of discussion, but which did not fit neatly
into any particular category. These cases are addressed under the heading
"Cases of Interest."
II. ATrORNEYS' FEES

Could it be true? Have we finally reached some semblance of stability
(and sanity) in the arena of attorney compensation? Over the past eight
years, Florida courts and the legislature have completely overhauled our
attorneys' fee statute on at least three separate occasions. After all of the
changes, we ended up, for the most part, exactly where we were when the
journey began; attorneys' fees are presumed reasonable if they are tied to a
certain percentage of the estate assets.4
This circuitous journey has, however, itself produced additional
problems for the practitioner. Practitioners have encountered three entirely
different methods for computing a "reasonable fee" in the 1990's: 1) the

1.
Rohan Kelley, Trusts & Estates: 1996 Survey of FloridaLaw, 21 NOVA L. REV. 385
(1996). Mr. Kelley's survey addressed case law and statutory changes from 1994 through the
first half of 1996. Id.
2.
FLA. STAT. § 90.602 (1997).
3.
See FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1997); FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1995); FLA. STAT. §
733.6171 (1993).
4.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.617, 733.6171 (1997).
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Supreme Court of Florida's 1991 decision in In re Estate of Platt;5 2) the
1993 version of section 733.6171 of the Florida Statutes;6 and 3) the 1995
version of section 733.6171 of the FloridaStatutes.7 Each of these methods
is capable of producing substantially different amounts in attorneys' fees. 8
Thus, one of the most important questions for the practitioner is which
statute governs the computation of fees for any particular estate.
The 1993 and 1995 statutes specifically provided that they were to apply to all estates which remained open as of the statute's effective
date. 9 Almost immediately, however, these provisions providing for retroactive application of the statute came under constitutional attack. 10 The
5.
586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991). In Platt, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
attorneys' fees could not be computed as a percentage of the estate. Id. at 336-37. Instead, the
Platt court required that fees be computed using the hourly-based lodestar method set forth in
FloridaPatient'sCompensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Platt,586 So. 2d
at 336-37.
6.
FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1993). The 1993 version of section 733.6171 provided for a
bifurcated computation of a "presumed reasonable" fee based on the sum of the following two
parts: a) the first part was tied to the liability or "risk" assumed by the attorney and was:
an amount equal to [two] percent of the inventory value of the estate assets
and the income earned by the estate during the administration and, if the
estate is required to file an estate tax return, an additional [one] percent on the
balance of the gross estate as finally determined for federal estate tax
purposes . . . [and b) the second part compensated] the attorney for the
professional time expended and was based upon the hourly based lodestar
method (similar to that in Platt).
Id. § 733.6171(3).
7.
FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3) (1995). The 1995 version of the statute, still in effect
today, provides for the computation of a "presumed... reasonable" fee for ordinary services
based upon a percentage of probate assets. Id. § 733.6171(3). The percentage varies depending
upon the size of the estate with a smaller actual percentage due for larger estates. Id.
8.
See Kelley, supra note 1, at 390-400 for an excellent discussion of the changes in
the fee statutes throughout the 1990's.
9.
FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1993) (providing that "[t]his section shall apply to
estates in which an order of discharge has not been entered prior to its effective date but not to
those estate in which attorneys' fees have previously been determined by order of [the] court after
notice"); FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(10) (1995) (providing for retroactive application with a
provision identical to the 1993 statute).
10. The Fifth District Court of Appeal was the first to address the issue in Williams
College v. Borne, 656 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("Williams College 11") and
Williams College v. Borne, 670 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("Williams College
III"). The Williams College courts held that retroactive application of the statute would be
unconstitutional. See Williams College 11, 670 So. 2d at 1121. Without discussing Williams
College If or III, and without addressing the constitutionality of retroactive application, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal reached the opposite result in Bitterman v. Bitterman, 685 So. 2d
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Supreme Court of Florida ultimately addressed these constitutional issues in
Bitterman v. Bitterman."1
An abbreviated version of the facts of Bitterman is worth repeating. Stephen Bitterman, the decedent's son and co-personal representative,
raised objection to the administration of the estate at almost every
turn. 12 According to the fourth district, Stephen "either object[ed), or threatened to object, to items such as his mother's petition for family allowances,
her continued use of an automobile titled in the decedent's name, her
petition for homestead ...to the home in which she was living, and her
retention of certain personal property."' 13 Stephen also attempted to void
both his mother's and brother's gifts under the will. He became "intimately
involved with every detail" of the case.' 4 In fact, Stephen directed that all
correspondence and pleadings be sent to him for review. Moreover, a review
of his attorney's phone records showed over 350 calls between Stephen and
the firm. 15 Stephen took the liberty of calling his attorney at home, in his
car, and even while he was on vacation.1 6 After all of this, Stephen furiously
contested the fees for his attorney, and for the administrator
ad litem who
17
was appointed to assist in the administration of the estate.
The issue before the Bitterman court was which statute would govern
the computation of fees.18 The attorneys in Bitterman commenced representation prior to the effective date of the 1993 statute.' 9 The attorneys argued
that their compensation was to be computed under the 1993 statute per
section 733.6171(8) of the FloridaStatutes.20 The Bitterman court held that
retroactive application of the 1993 statute would be unconstitutional. 2' The
court reasoned that the attorneys' right to receive fees and the corresponding
obligation to pay those fees vests at the time the attorney begins his
representation of the estate, and that the Florida Legislature could not
retroactively enhance this substantive right or obligation by legislative
861, 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The Bitterman case was appealed to the Supreme Court
of Florida, setting the stage for one of the most important trust and estate decisions of 1998. Id.
11. 714 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1998).
12. Id. at 358.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 360.
15. Id.
16. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 360.
17. Id. at 361.
18. Id. at 358.
19. Id. at 359.
20. Id. See also FA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1993).
21. Bittennan,714 So. 2d at 364-65.
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enactment. 22 Accordingly, the fees for the attorneys in Bitterman were to be
computed under the 1991 statute. 23
For the practitioner, this means: 1) if representation was commenced
prior to October 1, 1993, fees are computed under Platt; 2) if representation
was commenced after October 1, 1993 but before July 1, 1995, fees are
computed under the 1993 version of section 733.6171 of the Florida
Statutes; and 3) if representation was commenced after July 1, 1995, fees are
computed under the 1995 version of section 733.6171 of the Florida
Statutes.24
Many commentators have focused as much on what the Bitterman court
did not say as what it did say. The Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law
Section of the Florida Bar filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court of
Florida in support of retroactive application of the statute.25 The section's
apparent loss before the court, however, actually produced several smaller
victories. First, many attorneys were quick to point out that the court could
have struck down the entire statute and found that computing attorneys' fees
on the basis of a percentage of the estate was impermissible as explained in
Platt.26 By not striking down the statute as a whole or even discussing this
option, the court may have tacitly acknowledged the constitutionality of the
new statute and that fees can be computed as a percentage of the probate
estate. 27 In addition, the Bitterman case may actually provide a windfall for
an attorney who commenced representation after the effective date of the
1993 statute but before the 1995 statute. The Bitterman case would place
the attorney under the 1993 statute that generally permits much higher fees.28
22. Id. at 364 (adopting and quoting extensively the fifth district's decision in Williams
College III). The Williams College III court (and consequently the Bitterman court) relied upon
the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida in Young v. Altenhouse, 472 So. 2d 1152 (Fla.
1985), which held that the right to attorneys' fees is governed by the statute in effect at the time a
cause of action accrues. Id. at 1154.
23. Bilterman, 714 So. 2d at 364.
24. See FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1995).
25. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 358.
26. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991).
27. See, e.g., Robert Goldman, Bitterman v. Bitterman and Section Amicus Activity,
Remarks at 18th Annual Legislative Update and Recent Case Law Review of the Real Property,
Probate, and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar (July 24, 1998).
28. Bittennan, 714 So. 2d at 364. This advantage, however, may be more theoretical
than real. As explained by Mr. Kelley in his 1996 survey of this topic, the bifurcated
computation produced by the 1993 statute was widely perceived by the bench, the media, and the
bar as resulting in grossly excessive fee. Kelley, supra note 1, at 395. In fact, most courts would
scoff at the notion of awarding a presumed reasonable fee under the 1993 statute.
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An additional intriguing aspect of the Bitterman case was the Supreme
Court of Florida's holding concerning the "inequitable conduct doctrine. 29
Surprisingly, neither the Bitterman nor the Williams College v. Borne3 0 case
arose in the context of the method of computing a reasonable fee. Rather,
the issue before both courts was whether the attorney for the personal
representative could recover fees for litigating over fees ("fees on fees")
pursuant to section 733.6171(7) of the FloridaStatutes.31 The 1991 version
of the statute did not permit an attorney to recover fees on fees.32 Because
the attorneys in Bitterman commenced representation prior to the effective
date of the 1993 statute, the Bitterman court held that they were not entitled
to recover fees on fees under the statute.33
The Bitterman court nevertheless allowed recovery of fees on fees
based upon the "inequitable conduct" of Stephen Bitterman. 34 The court
held that "[t]he inequitable conduct doctrine permits the award of fees
[when] one party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith. 35
The court noted that 'bad faith may be found not only in the actions that led
to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of litigation,"' and that inequitable
conduct can be found when a party acts "vexatiously, wantonly,
or for
36
oppressive reasons" or with "recalcitrance and callous attitude."
The standard of "recalcitrance" or "egregious conduct" is much
different than the standards we are accustomed to under section 57.105 of
the Florida Statutes, such as no "justiciable issue of either law or fact. 37
The Bitterman court specifically found that section 57.105 did not apply
because the arguments concerning retroactive application of the fee statutes
raised justiciable issues.38 In fact, Stephen Bitterman ultimately prevailed.39
29. See Bitterman,714 So. 2d at 365.
30. 670 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
31. See Williams College 11, 670 So. 2d at 1120-21; Bittennan, 714 So. 2d at 358,364.
See also FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(7).
32. See FLA. STAT. § 733.6171 (1991); See also In re Platt, 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991)
(noting that an attorney cannot recover fees on fees under the 1991 statute).
33. See Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 364.
34. See id. at 365.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citations omitted)).
37. FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1997). Under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, fees
can only be awarded where there is "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact
raised by the ... losing party." Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 364-65 (quoting Whitten v. Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501,505 (Fla. 1982)); see also FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1997).
38. Bitterman, 714 So. 2d at 364-65 (noting that the uncertainty of the application of the
1993 changes was sufficient to place this Bitterman case outside of section 57.105).
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The court found, however, that Stephen's conduct during the course of the
administration of the estate and the fee dispute was "the type the conduct for
40
which the inequitable conduct doctrine was intended to apply.
The Bitterman court tempered its holding by noting that the doctrine is
"rarely applicable."4 '
However, the threat of attorneys' fees under
Bitterman's inequitable conduct doctrine should still prove to be a valuable
tool for any litigator, including a probate litigator faced with spurious estate
or trust litigation. Prior to Bitterman, there was generally little risk for a
recalcitrant will contestant, especially one who had his or her attorney on a
contingency fee, in continuing with litigation in the hopes of extracting a
settlement. The chance of a beneficiary being charged with fees individually, beyond his or her share of the estate,42 under section 57.105 is remote
because will contests almost always raise justiciable issues of fact. 43 The
inequitable conduct doctrine should, at the very least, provide another
"arrow in the quiver" of personal representatives who are forced to defend
groundless litigation.
The issue of "fees on fees" also arose in other contexts over the past
year. In In re Estate of Good,44 the attorney for the personal representative
hired a law firm to litigate the reasonableness of his attorneys' fees.45 The
issue before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Good was whether the
law firm representing the personal representative's attorney could recover its
fees from the estate.4 The Good court held that the attorney for the attorney
for the personal representative could not recover fees under section
733.6171(7) of the FloridaStatutes.47 The court reasoned that "the scenario
could be extended to an absurd degree in that the attorney for the personal

39.

Id. at 364.

40.
41.

Id.at 365.
See i.

42. It is well-settled that a beneficiary's share of the estate can be charged with attorneys'
fees under section 733.106(4) of the Florida Statutes, which provides "the court may, in its
discretion, [determine] from what part of the estate [fees] shall be paid." See FLA. STAT. §

733.106(4) (1997).
43. See, e.g., Williams v. King, 711 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that beneficiary shouldn't have been charged for fees individually under section 57.105

even though the trial court found her claims "frivolous and without merit" because "there was
some small... basis to file the suit in good faith").
44. 696 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

45.
46.

Id. at 877.
Il

47.

Id. at 877-78. See also FLA. STA. §733.6171(7) (1997).
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representative's attorney could hire a third law firm to litigate over the
reasonableness of its fees. 48
In so holding, the Good court itself may have created an absurd
dichotomy. According to the court, if the attorney for the personal
representative represents himself and litigates to recover fees, the attorney
can recover his litigation fees from the estate under section 733.6171(7) of
the Florida Statutes.49 However, if the attorney hires another lawyer to
proceed with that same litigation, the attorney is forced to pay the attorneys
fees out of his own pocket. This is true regardless of the fact that the fees
could be the same in either case.
In Zepeda v. Klein,50 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an
51
Section
attorney could not recover fees on fees in a guardianship case.
744.108(1) of the Florida Statutes allows an attorney to recover fees for
a
"services rendered.., on behalf of the ward. ' 2 The court reasoned that in 53
adverse.
contested fee hearing the interests of the attorney and the ward are
The court also relied upon the Platt case, which had held that the 1991
version of probate statute did not permit an attorney to recover for time
obtaining a fee award. 54
Most practitioners are familiar with the concept that an attorney who
provides a benefit to the estate is entitled to recover fees from the estate.
This concept is codified in section 733.106 of the FloridaStatutes.5" In In re
Estate of Paris,56 the question before the second district was whether the
attorney for an interested person was required to plead entitlement to
attorneys' fees in his initial pleading filed with the court, or at the very least
prior to trial.57 The attorney in Parishad successfully litigated a will contest
to conclusion, but failed to request attorneys' fees in his response to the
petition for administration. In denying fees from the estate, the trial court
58
held that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Stockman v. Downs
required the request for attorneys' fees to be pled. 59 The Paris court
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 877.
See Hurley, 480 So. 2d at 877; see also FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8) (1997).
698 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at330.
FLA.STAT. § 744.108(1) (1997).
Zepeda, 698 So. 2d at 330.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 733.106(3) (1997).
699 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 302.
573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
Paris,699 So. 2d at 302.
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reversed, holding that section 733.106 allows the attorney to apply for fees at
any time during the pendency of the estate.6 Accordingly,
the attorney
61
could petition for fees after the will contest had ended.
What may come as surprise to some is that the "benefit to the estate"
concept does not necessarily carry over into trust law. In Frymer v.
Brettschneider,62 a trust beneficiary sought to recover attorney's fees and
costs from trust assets for successfully defending the validity of a
trust. 63 The trial court allowed the beneficiary to recover her fees from the
trust under section 737.402(2)(u) of the Florida Statutes, which provides:
"[u]nless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, a trustee has
the power... [t]o pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and
other expenses incurred in the collection, care, administration, and
protection of the trust." 64
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. Relying on principles
of statutory construction, the court found that section 737.402(2)(u) applied
only to expenses incurred by a trustee. 66 The court reasoned that if the
legislature had intended a beneficiary to recover his or her attorney's fees
after upholding the validity, they could have so provided.6 7
The Frymer court also refused to allow the beneficiary to recover under
the "common fund" rule, holding that she did not satisfy all of the elements
of
the rule.6to the
Thelawsuit,
common"receive
fund rule
requires that
a "class,"
who did
contribute
substantial
benefits
as a result
of not
the

60. See id. The court relied upon its prior decision in Carmen v. Gilbert, 615 So. 2d.
701 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
61. See Paris, 699 So. 2d at 302 (citing Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla.

1991)).
62.
63.
64.
65.

710 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
at 11.
Id.
at 11-12.
Id.
at 12.

66. l
67. Frymer, 710 So. 2d at 12.
68. Id. at .13. The common fund rule generally permits the award of fees from a fund or
estate which has been benefitted by the rendering of legal services. See generally Hurley v.
Slingerland, 480 So. 2d 104, 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985). There are five prerequisites
which must be met: a) the existence of a fund over which the court has jurisdiction and from
which fees can be awarded; b) the commencement of litigation by one party which is terminated
successfully; c) the existence of a class which received, without otherwise contributing to the
lawsuit, substantial benefits as a result of the litigation; d) the creation, preservation, protection,
or increase of the fund as a direct and proximate result of the efforts of counsel for that party; and
e) a reasonable relationship between the benefit established and the fees incurred. Id. at 107-08.
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litigation.,, 69 The Frymer court found that the only beneficiary
benefitted by
70
the litigation was the beneficiary who defended the suit.
Another recent case shows that not every attorney, rendering a benefit
to an estate, is entitled to recover fees from a probate estate under section
733.106 of the FloridaStatutes.7' In Suntrust Bank v. Nichols, 72 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal refused to award fees to the attorney for the
decedent's court-appointed guardian after the guardian successfully
petitioned the court for revocation of a prior will and had a second will
admitted to probate.73 The court found that the guardian was an "interloper"
in the estate case because he did not have an interest in the outcome and
therefore was not an "interested person" under sections 731.201(21) 74 and
733.109(1) 75 of the Florida Statutes.76 The Nichols court also refused to
award fees to the guardian's attorney for work performed on behalf of the
guardian, which was tainted with a conflict of interest.77
This conflict of interest aspect of the Nichols holding was consistent
with another 1997 case, In re Estate of Montanez.78 In Montanez, the court
reversed a fee award to an attorney who had represented a personal
representative which the court found was not qualified to serve and had
engaged in a conflict of interest transaction with the estate. 79 The personal
representative in Montanez was the decedent's professional guardian. 80 The
guardian was not a trust company, a banking corporation, savings
association, or Savings and Loan and therefore was not qualified to serve
under sections 733.305 and 660.41 of the Florida Statutes.81 More
importantly, the guardian had a conflict of interest in that the decedent's
estate had a potential claim against the guardian and the decedent's nursing
69.

Frymer, 710 So. 2d at 12 (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR
§ 972 (2d ed. 1983)).
70. Id. at 12.
71. Suntrust Bank v. Nichols, 701 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 109-10.
74. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(21) (1997). "Interested Person" is defined generally to mean
"any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular
proceeding involved." Id.
75. FLA. STAT. § 733.109(1) (1997). Section 733.109 provides in relevant part that "any
interested person... may... petition the court... for revocation of probate." Id.
76. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 109-10.
77. Id. at 108.
78. 687 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
79. Id. at 946-47.
80. Id. at 945.
81. Id. at 946.

BOGERT, THE LAW OFTRUSTs & TRUSTEES
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home for neglect. The guardian entered into a settlement releasing itself
and the nursing home from liability on this claim.83 In a scathing opinion
directed to the guardian's attorney, the court found that neither the attorney
nor the guardian could recover any fees for their voidable acts.84
In Teague v. Hoskins,8 5 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the
statutory priority of attorneys' fees in a situation where the assets of the
estate are insufficient to pay all of the claims of creditors. 86 The question
certified from the lower court was:
ARE ATTORNEY'S FEES ASSESSED AGAINST THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF AN ESTATE AN EXPENSE
OF ADMINISTRATION AND THUS CLASS 1 PRIORITY OR
ARE THEY "OTHER CLAIMS" GRANTING THEM CLASS 8
STATUS? 7
In Teague, the personal representative brought an action against a
guardian for a beneficiary, alleging that the guardian breached a contract
with the estate to waive the beneficiary's rights to homestead and elective
share. 88 "The personal representative rejected an offer of judgement... to
resolve the action" and ultimately lost at trial. 89 The guardian was awarded
attorneys' fees under the offer of judgment statute. 90 The trial court and
district court held that the guardian's attorney's fees were a Class eight
priority under section 733.707 of the FloridaStatutes.91 The Supreme Court
of Florida reversed.92 The court found that the fees were generated because
of "the affirmative action of the personal representative" and were thereford
"entitled to inclusion in Class one [as] costs and expenses of
administration." 93
82. Id. at 945-46.
83. Montanez, 687 So. 2d at 945-46.
84. Id. at 947 (noting that the attorneys, "better than anyone else, knew or should have
known that the personal representative's attempt to settle the creditor's claim was self-dealing,

and created an inherent conflict.").
85.

709 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1998).

86

Id. at 1374.

87.

Id. at 1373.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 1374.
Teague,709 So. 2d. at 1374.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 733.707 (1997).
See Teague, 709 So. 2d at 1374.
Id- at 1374-75.
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The Teague court noted that if the "personal representative exceeded
[its] authority in bringing the action or in rejecting the offer of judgment,
then the trial court should surcharge the personal representative, not deny
Class 1 priority status to the obligation."9 4 The court also distinguished the
Teague case from cases in which a third party prevails on a claim against the
estate predicated on the decedent's liability. 5 In those cases, fees of the
third party remain Class eight status because 96they are not generated by
affirmative action of the personal representative.
The final case in this section should serve as reminder to all probate
attorneys to draft their fee agreements carefully. In Brooks v. Degler,97 the
attorney had a signed contingency fee agreement with an estate beneficiary
in a will contest. 98 The agreement provided that the attorney would
represent the beneficiary "in a claim for damages" against the personal
representative and other estate beneficiaries. 99 The attorney was successful
in getting the "will admitted to probate and [his client] appointed as personal
representative."' 10 The court held, however, that the attorney was not
entitled to recover fees under the contingency agreement. 10 1 The court
reasoned that the fee agreement only applied to "a claim for damages" and
recovery from that claim. 0 2 Although the attorney was successful "in
getting the will admitted to probate and [his client] appointed personal
representative; [a] claim for damages [never] materialized." 1 3 However, the
attorney was permitted to recover fees under section 733.106.104
III. CREDITORS' CLAIMS

During the past ten years, there has been quite a bit of activity in the
area of creditors' claims. The 1997 case of United States Trust Co. of
94. Id. at 1375.
95. Id. at 1374.
96. Id.
97. 712 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
98. Id at 420.
99. Id. (emphasis omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 421. The actual issue in Brooks was whether the attorney was entitled to
recover fees from the estate under section 733.106 and then again from his client under the terms
of his fee agreement (i.e., double-dip). Brooks, 712 So. 2d at 420-21. The Court never
addressed this issue, finding instead that the contract was invalid. Id.
102. Id. at421.
103. Id.

104. Id.
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Florida Savings Bank v. Haig, °5 continued this trend and seems to be a
mixed bag for the probate practitioner.1 6 It appears that the Haig case may
have raised more questions about creditors' claims than it answered.
Prior to the 1988 United States Supreme Court decision in Tulsa
ProfessionalCollection Services, Inc. v. Pope,1°7 it was generally accepted
among most states, 0 8 and certainly well-settled in Florida, 10 9 that notice by
publication barred the claims of known creditors if such claims were filed
later than the time period allowed by section 733.702 of the Florida
Statutes."0 The Supreme Court's decision in Pope was a substantial change
in the law with regard to creditors' claims. The Pope court held that if a
creditor's identity is "known or reasonably ascertainable" by the personal
representative, due process requires that the creditor be given notice by mail
or such other means which will ensure actual notice of the claims period."'
As a result of the Pope decision, Florida's rules and statutes were
revised to comply with the due process requirements mandated by the
Supreme Court. 112 Unfortunately, both Pope and Florida's rules and statutes
left us with many unanswered questions. For example, what is a "reasonably
ascertainable" creditor under section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes?
Is an individual with a judgment recorded in the public records of the
decedent's home county a "reasonably ascertainable" creditor? What is a
"diligent search" for creditors as required by section 733.212(4)(a)? What
would constitute an "impractical and extended" search for creditors, which is
not required of the personal representative under section 733.212(4)(a)?
105. 694 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
106. Id. at 770.

107. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
108. See David T. Smith & Robert M. Winick, Known orAscertainable Estate Creditors:
The PopeDecision,FLA. B. J. 66 ( Oct. 1988).
109. See Public Health Trust v. Estate of Jara, 521 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Coley v. Estate of Odom, 500 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1986). After Pope, a
new opinion was issued in Jara, finding notice by publication to known creditors was
constitutionally insufficient. Public Health Trust v. Estate of Jam, 526 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).

110. See Smith, supranote 108, at 66.
111. Pope,485 U.S. at491.
112. See In re Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, 537 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1988);
Estate of Gleason v. Gleason, 631 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re Estate of Hill,
582 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). For example, section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida
Statutes includes a requirement for a "diligent search" for "reasonably ascertainable" creditors.
See also In re Estate of Puzzo, 637 So. 2d 26, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (relying on Pope,
and now requires that all known creditors actually be served with a copy of the Notice of
Administration before the claims period to begin to run as to that creditor).
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The Fourth District Court of AppealS• of
113 Florida attempted to answer
In Haig, the decedent sold a
some of these questions in the Haig opinion.
house and provided the purchaser with a written guarantee that "a portion of
the house would be free of leaks and cracks." ' 1 4 The house did, in fact, leak
and the purchaser attempted to make a claim against the decedent's estate
but missed the claims period by eight days. 1 5 Finding that the purchasers
were "reasonably ascertainable creditors," the trial court granted their
petition to extend time to file a claim in the estate.! 6 The Fourth District
reversed, and in doing so, attempted to provide some guidance to
practitioners who remained confounded by some of Pope's unanswered
questions. 17
The district court held that because "contingent" or "conjectural"
claimants are not "ascertainable" creditors, Pope does not require that they
receive actual notice of the claims period.1 8 The court defined a "contingent
claim"e as "'one where the liability depends upon some future event, which
may or may not happen, which renders it uncertain whether there will ever
be a liability.""' 19
The Haig court commented on the search for creditors required of the
personal representative under section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
by quoting with approval the case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,"' which stated: '[n]or do we consider it unreasonable for the
State to dispense with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose
interests are either conjectural or future or, although they could be
discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to the
knowledge of the common truste.' '. 2.
Although its language is far from clear, it is the opinion of the authors
that Haig represents a small but significant retreat from Pope and could
prove extremely troublesome to contingent creditors, especially to
113. United States Trust Co. of Florida Sav. Bank v. Haig, 694 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
114. Id.at 770.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.at770-71.
118. Haig, 694 So. 2d at 771 (citing Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. Inc. v. Pope,
485 U.S. 478 (1988)).
119. Id. (citing Fowler v. Hartridge, 24 So. 2d 306,309 (1945) (citations omitted)).
120. 339 U. S.306, 317 (1950).
121. Haig, 694 So. 2d at 771 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950)). See also Jones v. SunBank/Miami, N.A., 609 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
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individuals or entities such as lenders, who rely on guarantees. For example,
assume a bank loaned money to "A" relying upon the guarantee of "B." If
"B" dies while "A" is current on the loan, "B's" guarantee is only a
contingent liability. Thus, when "B" dies, the bank is only entitled to
publication notice of the creditor's period. Therefore, if the bank is untimely
in filing its claim, it may be barred from seeking relief against the decedent's
estate based exclusively upon the published notice.
Solutions to this new dilemma are far from simple. Perhaps after Haig,
lenders, or those relying upon guarantees, will be required to define a
guarantor's death as an event of default under the note, which would require
the borrower either to pay off the loan or secure a new guarantor.
The final, and probably most disturbing consequence of Haig, is that it
may encourage a personal representative to avoid providing actual notice to
certain creditors other than what little, if any, notice they receive from
publication. 22 This is especially true for personal representatives who are
also beneficiaries of the estate. This case should certainly put contingent
creditors on notice that a lack of vigilance may now prove fatal to their
collection efforts.
IV. WILLS
The only place to start any discussion on the recent law relating to wills
is the case of Raimi v. Furlong.12 3 This case should be in the law files of
every probate practitioner. The Raimi case is an excellent source of
authority for Florida law on undue influence, testamentary capacity and civil
conspiracy.124 In addition, this case is a "must read" for anyone concerned
with liability issues relating to banks or trust companies.
The essential facts of Raimi are as follows. The decedent, Evelyn
Gruber, died on March 3, 1995. 12 Her nephew, Manuel Rainii, filed a
petition for administration over her last will ("Raimi Will"). 126 The
decedent's stepdaughter, Estelle Furlong ("Furlong"), filed a separate
petition for administration seeking to admit an earlier will to probate.127 In
addition, Furlong filed a petition to set aside the Raimi Will on the grounds
122. Haig, 694 So. 2d at 771.
123. 702 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (known to some as the "Evelyn
Gruber" case).
124. This article will not specifically address the civil conspiracy issue.
125. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1283.
126. Id.

127. Id.
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of undue influence, duress, and lack of testamentary capacity.' 8 In her
petition, Furlong alleged that the Raimi Will was the product of a conspiracy
between some of the decedent's
relatives, Sun Bank/Miami and certain
129
employees of Sun Bank.
In a surprising opinion, the trial court declined to admit the Raimi Will
to probate, finding that it was procured by the undue influence of Manuel
Raimi and that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. 130 In addition, the
trial court found that a "reprehensible conspiracy" had been formed
"between the decedent's relatives, Sun Bank/Miami and certain Sun Bank
employees.' 3 1 The trial court also ruled that the bank was "negligent in its
hiring, training, retention and supervision of [some of] its
employees."' 132 Based on the foregoing, the court entered judgment against
all defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,533,689.55. 13 The
court further assessed punitive damages against Sun Bank in the amount of
$4,500,000, against Manuel Raimi in the amount of $2,000,000 and against
two Sun Bank employees in the amount of $1,000,000 each. 34 In what was
surely a relief to the banking industry, as well as to all of the defendants, the
appellate court reversed on all counts. 35
In the Raimi opinion, the Third District Court
Appeal provided an
• , of136
excellent recitation of Florida law on undue influence, even though it did
not really reveal any new law in this area. The court provided a good
definition of undue influence, 137 outlined the elements that must be
established to raise a presumption of undue influence,' 38 including a list of

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Raimi, 702 So.2d at 1283.
131. Id. at 1284.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1285 (as to judgments against defendants); id. at 1285 (as to the
will contest); id. at 1286 (as to testamentary capacity); id. at 1288 (as to undue influence).
136. Id. at 1286-87.
137. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1287 (stating that "[i]nfluence must amount to over persuasion,
duress, force, coercion, or artful or fraudulent contrivances to such an extent that there is a
destruction of free agency and will power of the testator"). See also In re Estate of Carpenter,
253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971); Estate of Brock, 692 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re
Estate of Dunson, 141 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stating mere affection, kindness,
or attachment of one person for another does not itself constitute undue influence).
138. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1287. The elements are: 1) "a substantial beneficiary under the
will;" 2) "occupied a confidential relationship with the testator;" and 3) "was active in procuring

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/4

16

Simon and Hennessey: Estates, Trusts and Guardianships

1998]

Simon /Hennessey

factors for a court's consideration with regard to the element of "active
procurement,"' 139 explained the shifting of the burden to come forward with
14
evidence'"4 and restated the standard of proof in an undue influence case. 1
The court also noted that any undue influence, which may have been used to
procure earlier wills is wholly irrelevant on the issue of whether a
subsequent will is also the product of undue influence. 42
On the subject of testamentary capacity, the court gave every defendant
in a will contest a great statement of Florida public policy 1 43 and a good
definition of testamentary capacity, also known as "sound mind."' 44 This
case is a strong reminder that the legal standard for testamentary capacity is

surprisingly low. As the court pointed out, even an insane person may
execute a valid will during a lucid interval. 45 In fact, the court stated that
"[a] testator may still have testamentary capacity to execute a valid will even
though he may frequently be intoxicated, use narcotics, have an enfeebled

mind, failing memory, [or] vacillating judgment."1'4 For those who practice
in the estate area, it is significant to note the court's statement that
the contested will." See In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 701; Estate of Brock, 692 So. 2d
at 911; Elson v. Vargas, 520 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
139. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1207. The court listed the following non-exclusive list of
factors:
a) presence of the beneficiary at the execution of the will; b) presence of the
beneficiary on those occasions when the testator expressed a desire to make a
will; c) recommendation by the beneficiary of an attorney to draw the will; d)
knowledge of the contents of the will by the beneficiary prior to execution; e)
giving of instructions on preparation of the will by the beneficiary to the
attorney drawing the will; f) securing of witnesses to the will by the
beneficiary; and g) safekeeping of the will by the beneficiary subsequent to
execution.
Id. at 1287.
140. Id.
141. Id. The contestant must establish undue influence by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. (citing Tarsagian v. Watt, 402 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
142. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1287-88 n.13.
143. Id. at 1286. "It has long been emphasized that the right to dispose of one's property
by will is highly valuable and it is the policy of the law to hold a last will and testament good
wherever possible." Id.
144. Id. To execute a valid will, the testator need only have "the ability to mentally
understand in a general way (1) the nature and extent of the property to be disposed of, (2) the
testator's relation to those who would naturally claim a substantial benefit from his will, and (3) a
general understanding of the practical effect of the will as executed." Id.
145. Raini, 702 So. 2d at 1286.
146. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Weihe, 268 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1972)).
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testamentary capacity is determined solely by the testator's mental state at
the time the will was executed.' 47
Finally, two other points from the Raimi case are of particular
significance. First, the third district determined that the evidence of the
decedent's incapacity was insufficient as a matter of law. 48 Specifically,
tie court found that the neurologist's testimony was insufficient as a matter
of law to establish the decedent's incapacity because the neurologist could
not offer any opinion as to the decedent's testamentary capacity at any given
time nor 1did
he "allow for the possibility of the decedent having a lucid
49
interval."'
The second point of particular interest is the trial court's ruling as to
Sun Bank. Although the appellate court reversed the judgment against Sun
Bank, it did so on a technicality' 50 without addressing the substantive merits
of the claims against them. This case should be a wake-up call to those who
are concerned with fiduciary liability issues relating to banks and trust
companies doing business in Florida. Perhaps this case was an anomaly, but
it is now in the Reporters and definitely worthy of consideration.
Another case from the Third District Court of Appeal, American Red
151
Cross v. Estate of Haynsworth,l 5l is instructive
on two points. 152 First, it is a
good example of the proper use of partial revocation under section 732.5165
of the Florida Statutes. Second, it provides guidance as to the burden of
proof in testamentary capacity cases
involving a will executed after a
53
judicial determination of incapacity.1
The decedent, John Haynsworth, Jr., executed three wills in 1993: the
first in February, the second in July, and the third in November. 54 On July
31, 1993, a probate judge entered an order, nunc pro tunc to May 18, 1993,
which adjudicated Mr. Haynsworth totally incapacitated.'
After Mr.
Haynsworth's death on December 29, 1995, competing petitions for
administration were filed
by his relatives seeking to probate his February
56
will and his July will.'
.

.

147. Id. See also Coppock v. Carlson, 547 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
148. Raimi, 702 So. 2d at 1286.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1285. The judgment against Sun Bank was reversed based on a finding that
the claims of negligent hiring, retention and supervision were never pled or tried by consent. Id.
151. 708 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
152. Id. at 603-04.
153. Id. at 604.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Haynsworth,708 So. 2d at 604.
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The trial court found the February will invalid as a result of undue
influence 1 7 and the November will invalid because the decedent lacked the
testamentary capacity to15 9execute that will. 15 8 Thus, the trial court admitted
the July will to probate.
The appellate court answered three questions in disposing of this
case: "(1) what is required to establish testamentary capacity in the presence
of a prior adjudication of incompetency, (2) what party bears the burden of
demonstrating testamentary capacity . . . and, (3) if one part of a will is
invalid as the product of undue influence, is the entire will rendered
void?"' 0
As to testamentary capacity, the court set forth its definition,' 61 and then
found an adjudication of incapacity creates a presumption of a lack of
testamentary capacity as to any will executed during the period of such
adjudication, but such presumption may be overcome by proof that the will
was executed during a lucid interval. 162
As to the question of the burden of proof, the court held that "an
adjudication of incompetency shifts the burden of going forward with the
evidence on testamentary capacity to the proponent of the will.' ' 163 Finally,
as to the issue of partial invalidity, the court held that a finding that
64 a portion
of a will is invalid, should not render the entire document void.1
Three other 1997 cases deserve a brief discussion. In Larkin v.
Pirthauer,16s the fourth district held that under Rule 4-3.7 of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, an attorney who prepared and witnessed a
157. Id. at 605. The trial court invalidated the February will based on a fee award under
the will to the decedent's attorney of approximately five percent of the estate, which the court
determined was obtained by the undue influence of the attorney. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Haynsworth,708 So. 2d at 605.
161. Id. The court used the same definition of testamentary capacity as the Raimi court.
Rami v. Furlong, 702 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
162. Haynsworth, 708 So. 2d at 606. The court defined "lucid moment" to be "a period
of time during which the testator returned to a state of comprehension and possessed actual
testamentary capacity." Id.
163. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Ziy, 223 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1969)). Although an
individual declared incapacitated may execute a valid will, an adjudication of incapacity creates a
prima facie case against the proponent of the will. Id.
164. Id. See also Fla. STAT. § 732.5165. The assets ineffectively disposed of by the
invalid portion of the will would pass either through the residuary clause or, if there is no
residuary clause, by intestacy. Haynsworth, 708 So. 2d at 606. See also FLA. STAT. § 732.604

(1995) (failure of testamentary provisions) and FLA. STAT. § 732.101 (1997) ("intestate estate").
165. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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contested will, may not represent the personal representative in the litigation
aspects of the will contest. 66 Although the attorney was disqualified with
regard to the litigation, the court held that rule 4-3.7 did not disqualify the
lawyer from representing the personal representative with regard to other
matters pertaining to the administration of the estate.1 67
The second case, Sun Trust Bank, Nature Coast v. Nichols,' involved
aspects of both probate and guardianship law. 6 9 In the Nichols case, John
Jones was the court-appointed guardian for Donald Nichols. 170 After
Nichols' death, his daughter-in-law submitted Nichols' purported last will
for probate.
Jones filed a petition to revoke the will and submitted a
second will for probate. 72 The trial court revoked probate of the first will
and admitted the will submitted by Jones to probate. 7 3 Jones requested
attorneys' fees from the court, arguing
74 that he benefited the estate by
submitting the proper will for probate.
The fifth district held that because the ward, Nichols, was deceased at
the time the guardian, Jones, sought to revoke probate of the first will, Jones
was an interloper in the estate case.1 75 The court stated that Jones did not
have standing to contest the will under section 733.109(1)1 76 or section
731.201(21) of the FloridaStatutes. 77 As an "interloper" in the estate7 8 case,
in which he had no standing, Jones was not entitled to attorneys' fees.

166. Id. at 183. The court's ruling was based on the fact that rule 4-3.7 generally
prohibits attorneys from being advocates at trials where they may be witnesses on substantive
matters. Id.
167. Id.
168. 701 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See infra Part I for further discussion
of this case.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 107.
171. Id. at 109.
172. Id.
173. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 109.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 109-10.
176. Id. at 110. Section 733.109(1) of the Florida Statutes states that any interested
person may petition the court in which a will is admitted for probate for revocation of probate.
FLA. STAT.

§ 733.109(1) (1997).

177. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 109-10. Section 731.201(21) of the Florida Statutes defines
"interested person" as "any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the
outcome of a particular proceeding involved." FLA. STAT. § 731.201(21) (1997).
178. Nichols, 701 So. 2d at 110.
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The final case in this section, Kelsey v. Pewthers, 79 deals with the
remedy for a breach of a contract to make a will.1 80 This case is unique
because the court had to fashion a remedy against a promisor who was still
alive. Florida law clearly allows individuals to make contracts which set
forth how their assets will pass upon their death. 181 In addition, Florida case
law had already established that under the circumstances involving mutual
promises to make a will while both promisors were still alive, either of them
could rescind the contract by revoking his or her will, or making a different
disposition of their property after providing proper notice to the other
party. 1 2 The Kelsey case provides a new twist in Florida law because the
plaintiffs had provided independent considerationfor the contract, not just a
simple promise to make a reciprocal will. Thus, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal found that the plaintiffs had a viable cause of action for, breach of
contract against the promisor upon her repudiation of the contract.
The promisor, Floraine Kelsey, was a ninety-one year old widow when
she entered into a contract to make a will with her nephew, Troy Pewthers,
and his wife, Martha. 183 Under the contract, the Pewthers were required to
take care of Kelsey for the remainder of her life and as their sole
compensation, the Pewthers were entitled to receive all of the real and
personal property owned by Kelsey at the time of her death. 184 The Pewthers
provided services to Kelsey
for sixteen months, after which Kelsey
185
terminated the relationship.
Finding that Kelsey had breached her contract with the Pewthers, the
trial court awarded the Pewthers damages against Kelsey in the amount of
$242,000 plus prejudgment interest of $37,267.20. 186 The amount of the
damage award, which was based on a "benefit of the bargain" theory,
actually exceeded the amount of Kelsey's total assets as of the date of the
judgment. 187 The appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court
179. 685 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
180. Id. at 953.
181. See FLA. STAT. § 732.701 (1997). For an excellent discussion of contracts to make a
will, see DAVID T. SMrrH, FLORIDA PROBATE CODEMANUAL, Ch. 2, at 49 (1998).

182. See Boyle v. Schmitt, 602 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Smith, supra
note 181, at49.
183. Kelsey, 685 So. 2d at 954.
184. Id.
185. Id. Kelsey called her daughter at 5:30 a.m. and told her she was afraid that Troy
Pewther was trying to kill her. Id.
186. Id. at 955.

187. Kelsey, 685 So. 2d at 955. Thejudgment amount was comprised of the present value
of the Pewthers's expected inheritance from Kelsey, as estimated by the Pewther's expert, plus
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judgment relating to contract damages and took on the difficult task of
fashioning an appropriate remedy for the promisor's breach.188 Given the
language of the contract and the fact that the case involved a living promisor,
the court determined
that a benefit of the bargain damages were not available
189
to the plaintiffs.
There were several reasons for the court's decision. First, because the
contract did not involve specific property but only property "owned by
Kelsey at the time of her death," the property to which the plaintiff had a
claim could not be identified until the promisor's death. 19° Second, the
promisor may have no property left at her death. 91 Finally, a living
promisor is entitled to the full, unrestricted, use of her property during192her
lifetime as long as that use does not constitute a fraud on her agreement.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court held that the appropriate
measure of damages was either quantum meruit during the promisor's life or
the imposition of a constructive trust on the promisor's property, allowing
use on such property during her lifetime, absent proof
full and unrestricted
93
of fraud.'
V. HOMESTEAD
During the past two years, the Florida courts were moderately active in
94
the area of homestead law. In the most interesting case, Snyder v. Davis,'
the Supreme Court of Florida may even have engaged in a bit of legislating
from the bench. 195 Florida attorneys practicing in the area of estate planning
would be well-advised to review the Snyder case. The three cases we will
address in this section deal with the constitutional protections provided to
Florida homestead. The Florida Constitutionprotects homestead property in
three ways: 1) Article VII, section 6 provides the homestead with an
exemption from property taxes; 2) Article X, sections 4(a) and (b) protect
several lifetime gifts, less an adjustment for a ten percent life interest to Kelsey's daughter, as
required by the contract. Id. The judge failed to account for the costs of litigation and certain
other of Kelsey's expenses. Id.
188. Id. at956-57.
189. Id. at 956.
190. Kelsey, 685 So. 2d at 954-55.
191. Id. at 955.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 956.
194. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997).
195. Id. at 1007 (Harding, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Harding accused the
majority of "creating law, which is more properly the office of the legislature." Id.
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the homestead from forced sale by creditors; and 3) Article X, section 4(c)
sets forth the restrictions
upon a homestead owner's right to devise
96
homestead property.1
In the case of Knadle v. Estate of Knadle,19 7 the First District Court of
Appeal provided a clear, albeit harsh, reminder that in order to avail oneself
of the homestead protections provided by Article X, section 4 of the Florida
Constitution, one must closely adhere to the law regarding the devise of
homestead property. 198 The decedent, Evangeline Knadle, died testate at age
eighty survived by two adult children, no spouse and no minor children. 99
Her will directed her personal representative to sell her homestead and add
the net proceeds from the sale to the residue of her estate for ultimate
distribution to her two adult children. 2°° The appellate court held in a
previous case that where a testator directed in her will that her homestead be
sold and the proceeds placed in the residue of the estate for distribution
along with other assets, the property lost its homestead character and was,
therefore, "subject to the claims of creditors." 20 Perhaps as a "look what
you could have done" remark, the court took the time to specifically mention
the case of In re Estate of Tudhope. °2 Because the homestead property in
Tudhope was not converted to dollars before it passed and vested in the
decedent's adult children, the property
retained its homestead character and
203
was not subject to creditors' claims.
In what was more of a new application of existing law than a new
2 4
concept, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Crain v. Putnam
preserved the homestead status of an elderly woman's home despite the fact
that she was not actually living in the house.20 Mrs. Crane suffered
extensive brain damage as a result of an illness and in 1992, was placed in a
nursing home in a vegetative state. 206 In 1994, the county property appraiser

196. Id. at 1001-02.
197. 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
198. Id. at 632. See also Estate of Price v.West Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
199. Knadle, 686 So. 2d at 632.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Estate of Price v. West Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.

App. 1987)).
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. (citing In re Estate of Tudhope, 595 So. 2d 312 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
Estate of Tudhope, 595 So. 2d at 313.
687 So. 2d 1325 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1325.
Id.
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denied a homestead exemption 2°7 on her house because she had not lived in
the house for over two years. 20 8 The trial court agreed and concluded, as a
matter of law, that if the taxpayer "was not actually residing on the property,
for whatever reason, no exemption is available.""2 9
The fourth district reversed, and held that Mrs. Crain was entitled to the
homestead exemption even though she was not physically residing in the
house. 210 The issue before the court was whether the property was being
"used" within the meaning of section 196.101(1) or (2) of the Florida
Statutes.2 1 The court found it significant that Mrs. Crain had been
involuntarily removed from her home due to illness, that she was unable to
communicate any intention regarding her residency, that all of her furniture,
clothing and most of her possessions were in the house and that she
212
Florida courts have made similar rulings
continued to receive mail there.
with regard to Article X protections, but this appears to be the first case
213
involving Article VII and section 196.101 of the FloridaStatutes.
The big news in homestead law came from the Supreme Court of
Florida in the case of Snyder v. Davis.2 14 In Snyder, the Supreme Court of
215
The
Florida may have even engaged in a bit of legislating from the bench.
facts in Snyder are simple. Betty Snyder died testate survived by an adult
son, Milo Snyder, an adult granddaughter, Kelli Snyder (Milo's daughter),
no spouse and no minor children. 216 In her last will, Mrs. Snyder devised her
home to her granddaughter, Kelli. 2" The personal representative of Mrs.
Snyder's estate sought to sell the homestead to fund specific bequests, to pay
the cost of administration of the estate and to pay creditors. 2 ' 8 Kelli objected
to the sale and claimed the homestead property passed to her free of claims
207. Id. Under section 196.101 of the Florida Statutes, Mrs. Crain's son sought an
exemption from taxes on real estate used and owned as a homestead, as described by Article VII,
Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution, by totally and permanently disabled persons. Id. See
also FLA. STAT. § 196.101 (1993).
208. Crain,687 So. 2d at 1325.
209. Id. at 1326.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1325-26. See also FLA. STAT. § 196.101(1). Section 196.012(4) of the
Florida Statutes defines "use" as "the exercise of any right or power over real or personal
property incident to the ownership of the property." Id.
212. Crain, 687 So. 2d at 1325.
213. Id. at 1326.
214. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997).
215. Id. at 1007 (Harding, J., dissenting). See supranote 195.
216. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1000.
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under the protections of Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.
The trial judge ruled that the homestead provisions applied to the devise to
Kelli and, as such, the homestead property was protected from creditor's
claims. 220 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and held that
because the decedent's son, Milo, would have been the sole heir had the
decedent died intestate, Kelli, the granddaughter, could not benefit from the
homestead's protection against creditors. 22'
The district court's position was based on a strict reading of the Florida
Constitution and Florida Statutes.2 2 Under Article X, section 4(b), the
homestead exemption inures only to a "surviving spouse or heirs of the
owner." 223 Because the Florida Constitution does not define "heirs," the
district court looked to section 731.201(18) of the Florida Statutes, which
states: "heirs... means those persons, including the surviving spouse, who
are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a
decedent.,2 4 As the district court explained:
If Betty Snyder had died intestate, Milo Snyder would have
inherited everything as her "heir," i.e., next lineal descendant in
line, and Kelli Snyder, under any construction of section 732.103,
would have inherited nothing. This would be so because
inheritance in Florida is "per stirpes." § 732.104, Fla. Stat. (1993).
Because Milo Snyder survived, Kelli Snyder is not an intestate
"heir" of her grandmother.=
In an opinion sprinkled with classic quotes and not so subtle irony, the
The
Supreme Court of Florida quashed the opinion of the second district.
Supreme Court of Florida's opinion focused on two primary issues. First,
the court held that, where there is no surviving spouse or minor children, the
constitutional homestead protection against creditors "may inure to the
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1001.
221. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001.
222. Id.
223. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b); see Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
224. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(18) (1997).
225. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001. The Second District Court of Appeal followed this
reasoning two more times in 1997 in In re Estate of Farrior,694 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) and In re Estate of Hinterleiter,692 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
However, the first district took the opposite view in Walker v. Mickler, 687 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997). This conflict among the districts precipitated the appeal of Snyder to the
Supreme Court of Florida. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001.
226. Id. at 1005-06.
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benefit of [a] person to whom the homestead property is devised by a
will. '227 Surprisingly, the issue of whether the term "heirs" in the homestead
provisions of the Florida Constitution included devisees under a will had
never before been addressed by the court. 228 In reaching its conclusion, the
court stated "if we defined the term 'heirs' in the homestead provision by its
strict common-law definition, the very act of devising the homestead would
abolish the homestead protections against creditors. 22 9
The second portion of the court's ruling will certainly be a bit more
controversial. Rejecting a narrow definition of the term "heirs" that would
include only those individuals who would inherit under Florida's intestacy
statute at the death of the testator, the court held that the homestead
provision of the Florida Constitutionallows an individual with no surviving
spouse or minor children to devise, by will, homestead property, along with
its protection from creditors, to any family member within the "class" of
persons categorized in the Florida intestacy statute.230
The upside of this ruling is that it allows the testator, rather than fate or
the Florida intestacy statute, to choose who will best preserve and protect the
family homestead property.231 The downside of this opinion is that the
millionaire second cousin of the testator' s dead fourth wife could receive the
homestead, with all its accompanying protections from creditors, while the
doctor who treated the testator's last illness remained unpaid. Apparently,
the majority was willing to accept this consequence of their ruling and stated
that they would not be deterred 'simply because 'financially independent
heirs may receive' a windfall."''2 32 In fact, the court stated that 233
the
"homestead protection has never been based on principles of equity."
Whether the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Snyder furthers the
public policy considerations behind the homestead protections will certainly
be a matter of some debate in the coming years.

227. Id. at 1003.
228. Id. at 1002.
229. Id. at 1003.
230. Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1005.
231. Id. The court said that to adopt a narrow definition of "heirs" would turn willmaking into an "act of prophecy" because in order to preserve the homestead protections, the
testator would have to predict which of his family would survive him. Id.
232. Id. at 1002 (quoting Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 950 (Fla. 1988)).
233. Id.
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VI. DEADMAN'S STATUTE

The mere mention of the deadman's statute is enough to make most
practitioners shudder. So much so, in fact, that many practitioners
inadvertently waive the deadman's statute and ignore the potential impact it
could have on their cases. Two recent cases in this area, In re Estate of
Stetzko 234 and Tarr v. Cooper,235 provide some insight into how the
deadman's statute can be a determining factor in the outcome of a case.
In the Stetzko case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal delivered what
could be a fatal blow to the deadman's statute in will contests and other
similar litigation. In Stetzko, the personal representative filed an action to
set aside lifetime transfers of the decedent, which were alleged to be the
product of undue influence and duress.236 The fourth district held that the
statute is waived if the protected person introduces any documentary
evidence concerning the subject matter of the oral communication.2 3 7 The
court specifically recognized "that in most, if not all, will contests, the
statute will be waived because the person attempting to uphold the will must
first introduce it and show that it was properly executed. Similarly, in other
contests where a protected38 person must first prove an inter vivos act...
waiver will likely result."'2
If the Stetzko case is a good example of when the statute is inapplicable,
the Tarr case is a perfect example of how the deadman's statute should be
used to protect an estate from creditors' claims. In the Tarr case, the trial
court entered a summary judgment against a creditor due, in large part, to the
deadman's statute. 23 9 The creditor in Tarr attempted to prove the contents of
an oral contract with the decedent.24 The Tarr court held that without the
creditor's testimony, which was barred by the deadman's statute, the
material terms of the contract could not be established. 24 Hence, summary
judgment in favor of the estate was appropriate. 242
The Stetzko and Tarr cases, combined, show the opposite ends of the
spectrum on the deadman's statute and provide recent examples of how
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

714 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
708 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Stetzko, 714 So. 2d at 1088.
Id. at 1090.
Id. (quoting CHAR..s W. EHRHARDT, FLORiDA EvI ENCE § 602.1, at 358-59 (1997

239.
240.
241.
242.

See Tarr,708 So. 2d at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.

ed.)).
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courts apply this confusing statute. These cases are further evidence of the
need for legislative action on the deadman's statute. The Probate Litigation
Committee of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The
Florida Bar has recently formed a committee to examine Florida's
deadman's statute and to make a recommendation regarding its amendment
or repeal.243 Perhaps this committee can make some sense of this terribly
confusing statute.
VII. CASES OF INTEREST

There were numerous cases decided in 1997 and 1998 which do not fit
well into any of the topic areas delineated in this article, but which merit
discussion nonetheless. The first of these cases is the Third District Court of
Appeal's decision in Martin v. Martin. 4 Many practitioners may be
familiar with the 1981 case of DeWitt v. Duce, 24 in which the Florida
Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff has an adequate remedy in probate,
that remedy must be exhausted before the plaintiff can pursue a claim for
246
Until 1997, however, there were
tortious interference with an inheritance.
no cases which discussed the application of this potential bar to an action for
tortious interference as it related to an inter vivos trust.
In Martin, the decedent's children sued their stepmother alleging that
she tortiously interfered with their right to inherit by unduly influencing the
decedent into making gifts to an inter vivos trust which effectively
disinherited them. 247 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the stepmother and held that the claim for tortious interference was barred
because the children had not pursued their claim in the probate proceedings
as required by DeWitt.248 The Martin court reversed and held that the bar to
recovery in DeWitt was not applicable to the case before it.249 The court
reasoned that the assets contained in the trust, which was substantially
funded prior to death, were not part of the probate estate and not subject to
243. Id.
244. 687 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
245 408 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1981).
246. Id. at 220.
247. Martin, 687 So. 2d at 904.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 905-08. The Martin court was careful to point out that it was only deciding
the particular case based upon the particular facts before it. See id. at 907-08. There may be
other trust cases when DeWitt will serve as a bar to recovery. For example, if the revocable trust
is simply an unfunded trust, into which the will pours over, the result could be different. See id.
at 907 (noting specifically that the trust was ninety-five percent funded).
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administration.250 Even if the children had successfully contested the will,
they would not have received the trust assets.25' Accordingly, the court
permitted the children
to proceed with their tortious interference claim
252
trust.
the
to
relating
The Martin case also included an excellent procedural point regarding a
challenge to a will and trust.25 3 Many practitioners proceed under the
misconception that it is always permissible to file their trust actions as part
of the petitions for revocation of probate. The Martin case serves as a
reminder that the proper practice is to file a separate trust complaint under
sections 737.201 and 737.206 of the FloridaStatutes. 4 Thereafter, the trial
court can consolidate the two actions if it is appropriate to do so.255
56
In Stept v. Paoli,2
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
"face of the will doctrine," which essentially sounded the death knell for
malpractice actions against the scrivener of a will by estate beneficiaries,
applies with equal force to revocable trusts. 2 57 The "face of the will
doctrine" generally prevents an estate beneficiary from recovering on a
malpractice claim against the attorney who drafted the will unless he or she
can show that the testator's intent as expressed in the will is frustrated, and
the beneficiary's legacy is lost or diminished as a direct result of the
attorney's negligence. 8 The Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted the
"face of the will doctrine" as placing a major limitation on malpractice
actions against drafting attorneys.25 9
The Stept case provides a prime example of how the "face of the will
doctrine" can serve as a bar to a beneficiary's suit. In Stept, the trust
beneficiaries filed a malpractice action against the drafting attorney claiming
250. Martin, 687 So. 2d at 907.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id at 907.
254. Id.
255. Martin, 687 So. 2d at 908.
256. 701 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
257. Id. at 1229.
258. See Espinosa v. Sparber, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993); Miami Beach
Community Church, Inc. v. Stanton, 611 So. 2d 538, 538 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
259. Espinosa, 612 So. 2d at 1380. Finding the privity exception to be "a limited one,"
the court held an action only lies when the testator's intent as expressed in the will itself, not as
shown by extrinsic evidence, is frustrated due to the negligence of the testator's attorney. Id. The
court reasoned that to allow such evidence would dramatically increase the risk of misinterpreting
the testator's intent, as well as "heighten[ing] the tendency to manufacture false evidence that
could not be rebutted due to the unavailability of the testator." Id. This limitation often proves
very difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. Id.
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that his drafting error in the decedent's revocable trust cost the estate
260
approximately $100,000 in additional estate taxes.
The trial court
dismissed the action with prejudice finding that the revocable trust "did not
contain the expressed intent of the testator to avoid or minimize taxes. 26'
On appeal, the beneficiaries acknowledged that the "face of the will
doctrine" would prevent recovery if it applied, but argued that the doctrine
was not applicable to revocable trusts. 262 The Stept court disagreed, holding
that there is "no reason to expand the limited privity exception" in cases of
revocable trusts.26 3
In the last case, Nayee v. Nayee,264 one of the issues addressed by the
Court was whether certain informal documents would qualify as "other
statements" within the meaning of section 737.307 of the Florida Statutes,
thus barring a beneficiary from bringing an action against a trustee. 265 The
Nayee case is both interesting and important because it is the first to explain
what needs to be included in an "other statement" in order to start the statute
of limitations running under section 737.307. The trustee in Nayee was sued
for an accounting of a family trust by the trust beneficiaries, which consisted
2 7
266
The trust had commenced in 1979. 1
of his brother and two nephews.
The trustee claimed....
that the beneficiaries were ..barred from bringing
268 their
actions because he disclosed his trust dealing in a 1987 meeting.
The
trustee had notes from the meeting and copies of handwritten accounts,
which he had provided to the beneficiaries.
The handwritten statements
showed a list of payments to various persons and entities, such as the IRS

260. Stept, 701 So. 2d at 1229.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 705 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
265. See id. at 965. See also FLA. STAT. § 737.307 (1997). Pursuant to section 737.307
of the Florida Statutes, a beneficiary who has received a final, annual, or periodic account or
"other statement fully disclosing the matter" is barred from bringing an action against the trustee
unless a proceeding to assert the claim is commenced within six months after receipt of the
account or statement. FLA. STAT. § 737.307 (1997). There are no other Florida cases defining the
meaning of "other statement."
266. Nayee, 705 So. 2d at 961-62.
267. Id. at 961.
268. Id. at 962. The trustee argued that the beneficiaries were barred under section
95.1 1(3)(p) of the FloridaStatutes. See id.
269. Nayee, 705 So. 2d at 963.
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but no explanation for any of the payments was offered. 270 The trial court
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the trustee.27 1
The Nayee court reversed, finding, among other things, that the
"informal statements" did not contain sufficient information to start the
statute of limitations running under section 737.307 of the Florida
Statutes.272 The court noted that the "informal statements did not include the
most basic accounting information [and] provided no explanation for any of
the payments. 273
VIII. 1997 AND 1998 STATUTORY CHANGES

The years of 1997 and 1998 were relatively quiet for new legislation in
the areas of estates, trusts, and guardianships. Instead, the legislature
focused its efforts on general housekeeping to resolve ambiguities and
potential problem areas within the statutes. Rather than discuss all of the

changes to the statutes in 1997 and 1998, this article will highlight
significant legislation that is of interest to most practitioners.

74

270. Id. at 965.
271. Id. at 963. The trial court found that the beneficiaries were barred under the general
four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11 of the FloridaStatutes. Id. at 962,
272. Id. at 965. See also FLA. STAT. § 737.307 (1997). The court also held that, unless an
accounting is provided to the beneficiaries pursuant to section 737.307 of the FloridaStatutes,
which is sufficient to start the six-month period running, an action for an accounting is governed
by common-law laches not by section 95.11 of the FloridaStatutes. Nayee, 705 So. 2d at 963.
The court noted that "laches requires a showing of an unreasonable delay in asserting a known
right which causes undue prejudice to the party against whom a claim is asserted." Id. Moreover,
laches does not begin to run until the beneficiary has actual knowledge of an unequivocal act in
repudiation of the trust or actual knowledge of adverse possession by the trustee. Id. at 964. The
court held that the repudiation must be open and "brought home" to the beneficiary. Id. at 964.
273. AL at 965.
274. In addition to the changes set forth in the text to this article, the legislature also
amended: 1) the homestead exemptions to provide that Roth IRAs and medical savings accounts
are exempt from creditors, FLA. STAT. §§ 222.21-.22 (1997); 2) the statutes concerning Viatical
Settlements to include detailed disclosure provisions, misrepresentation penalties, and provisions
for "related provider trusts," FLA. STAT. § 626.9911; 3) the list of property exempt from probate
creditors under section 732.402 to include Florida Prepaid College Program contracts; and 4)
numerous provisions concerning anatomical gifts. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.910-.922 (Supp. 1998).
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FloridaIntangibles Tax2 75

Earlier this year, the Florida Legislature considered a number of bills
related to the intangibles tax ranging from proposals to repeal the tax in its
entirety to measures designed to close perceived loopholes in the tax. The
Florida Legislature ultimately passed several statutory changes relating to
the intangibles tax, including provisions which: 1) increased the filing
threshold for individuals from five dollars of tax to sixty dollars of tax,
effectively increasing the tax exemption for single individuals from $25,000
to $80,000 and for married individuals from $45,000 to $100,000;276
2) repealed the intangibles tax on one-third of otherwise taxable accounts
receivable; 27 7 3) exempted certain compensatory stock options as well as
stock received pursuant to the exercise of such options from the intangibles
tax; 278 and 4) reduced penalties for failing to timely file an intangibles tax
return. 279
Significantly, the "anti-avoidance" measures never received serious
consideration. Rather than remove the incentives to implement planning
strategies, the legislature actually made such planning more palatable to
many by enacting a provision which allows taxpayers who transfer their
intangibles to out-of-state trusts or partnerships to maintain their existing
asset management relationships with Florida based banks and trust
companies. 280
Prior to the 1998 legislation, assets managed under
discretionary arrangements by a Florida bank or trust company would
technically be subject to intangibles tax even if such assets were owned by a
non-Florida entity.
In addition to the legislative changes enacted this year, the Department
of Revenue completed an extensive rule-making project dealing specifically
with the application of the intangibles tax to out-of-state trusts and
partnerships.
The new rules set forth several "safe-harbor" requirements
275. The authors would like to thank Stephen G. Vogelsang, Esq., a shareholder in the
law firm of Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A. for his insight and analysis into the
impact of the Florida Intangible Tax changes.
276. Ch. 98-132, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 885, 886 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
199.052(2)).
277. Ch. 98-132, § 6(1), 1998 Fla. Laws 885, 889 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
199.185).
278. Id. § 6(m), 1998 Fla Laws at 889 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 199.185).
279. Ch. 98-132, § 9, 1998 Fla. Laws 891 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 199.282).
280. Ch. 98-132, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 886 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 199.052).
(permitting a bank or savings association to act as a fiduciary or agent of the trust).
281. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12C-2.006 - 12C-2.0063 (1998).
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for transfers to out-of-state trusts and partnerships which, if complied with,
ensure that such arrangements effectively remove the transferred assets from
Florida for intangibles tax purposes.
Although the new rules were
intended to merely restate the Department's existing position with respect to
out-of-state trusts and partnerships, the rules actually create several new
planning complexities that must be addressed when considering transfers to
out-of-state entities.
In sum, although the intangibles tax has received
increased scrutiny over the past year, opportunities to reduce or eliminate
liability for the tax are still available to many individuals.
B.

Chapter97-240: Omnibus Trust, Estate, and GuardianshipLegislation

In 1997, the Florida Legislature passed chapter 97-240, which effected
numerous unrelated provisions of the trust, estate, and guardianship laws. 284
Chapter 97-240 was geared toward closing up what were perceived as
potential problem areas within the statutes relating to estate tax issues, trust
and estate administration issues, includiny fiduciary investments, and, to a
lesser extent, trust attorneys' fees issues.
The first item addressed by chapter 97-240 was the adoption of a
technical amendment to the Florida's Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
("FSRAP") which is intended to preserve Generation-Skipping Transfer tax
exemption for certain Florida trusts. 286 Prior to the amendment, a trust
would lose its Generation-Skipping Transfer tax exemption if the donee of a
special power of appointment in a pre-1986 (grandfathered) trust exercises
the power so as to violate the common law rule against perpetuities by
extending the trust beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years. 287
Accordingly, drafting to allow the maximum period under the FSRAP could
288
result in loss of tax-exempt status.
The FSRAP now includes a section,
which provides that language in a trust or other property arrangement, which
would allow the exercise of the power beyond the common law period, is

282. Id.
283. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of these rules is beyond the scope of this survey.
284. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-240. This survey will only highlight the more significant
changes effected by Chapter 97-240.
285. Id.
286. Ch. 97-240, § 11997 Fla. Laws 4404,4404 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.225).
287. Jesse Dukeminier, The Unifonn Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST
Tax: New Perilsfor PractitionersandNew Opportunities,30 REAL PROP., PROB. T. J. 185, 189
(1995).
288. d
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inoperative. 289 As most probate lawyers will recall, the Florida Legislature
enacted section 737.111 in 1995 that generally provides that the testamentary
aspects of a trust are invalid unless the trust is executed with the formalities
of a will.
The 1995 version of the statute failed to include a
grandfathering provision for those trusts executed prior to its effective date.
Chapter 97-240 added section 737.111(6), which provides that the section
will not apply to trusts executed prior to October 1, 1995.291 Chapter 97-240
also exempts from the execution requirements of the statute trusts
established as part of employee annuity described in section 403 of the
Internal Revenue Code, IRAs, Keogh Plans, and qualified plans under
section 401 of the InternalRevenue Code.292
Chapter 97-240 also helped alleviate the confusion that had arisen in
connection with the amount of fees payable to an attorney who renders
services in connection with the initial administration of a revocable trust
after the death of the settlor. Prior to the amendment, section 737.511(5)
provided that the presumptively reasonable compensation under section
737.2041(3) would not apply when a corporate fiduciary was serving as
trustee or co-trustee of the revocable trust. 3 Instead, the fees were to29be
4
determined under the particular facts and circumstances of the trust.
Under Chapter 97-240, the language requiring disparate treatment was
removed from section 737.2041.295
Accordingly, the presumptively
reasonable fee is the same regardless of whether the trustee is a corporate
fiduciary or an individual. 2 16 Chapter 97-240 also added a new section,
737.2041(3), which provides that an attorney who is hired to perform limited
or specially defined services is entitled to receive fees per their fee
agreement, or an hourly-based fee under section 737.2041(6).
Section 737.303 of the FloridaStatutes was amended to provided that
the trustee's duty to account or provide a statement of accounts, with respect
to a revocable trust, applies only to the grantor or the legal representative of
289. Ch. 97-240, § 1 1997 Fla. Laws 4404,4404 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 689.225).

290. See FLA.

STAT.

§ 737.111 (1997).

291. See Ch. 97-240, § 4, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4407 (to be codified at
737.111).
292. Id.
293. See FLA. STAT. § 737.2041 (1995).
294. See id.
295. See Ch. 97-240, § 5, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4407 (to be codified at
737.2041).
296. See id.
297. Id.
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the grantor during the grantor's lifetime.29 8 In other words, the beneficiary
of a revocable trust no longer has a right to review the trust statements
during the grantor's lifetime. Of particular note, however, is the fact that the
beneficiary may still have a right to receive a complete copy of the trust
about the assets of the trust and the
agreement and "relevant information 299
particulars relating to administration.
Another change contained in chapter 97-240 is related to Florida's
Prudent Investor Rule.3 00 Section 518.112 of the Florida Statutes,
concerning the delegation of investment functions to an investment agent,
was amended to clarify that the fiduciary does not simply give up
responsibility for investments once it chooses to delegate. 301 The new bill
requires that the fiduciary exercise reasonable care, judgment, and caution in
selecting the investment agent, in establishing the scope and specific terms
of the delegation, and in reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor
overall performance and compliance with the scope and terms of the
delegation. 302 These new requirements appear to add no real substance to
the duties of a fiduciary as these requirements were arguably always implicit
within the statute.30 3 Chapter 97-240 also adds a new subsection 518.112(c),
which provides that a fiduciary who administers life insurance contracts
(such as the trustee of an irrevocable life insurance trust) is not obligated to
diversify or allocate assets relative to the contract until the contract matures
and the policy proceeds are received.3 °4
The legislature clarified two ambiguities in section 738.12 of the
FloridaStatutes, Florida's Underproductive Property Statute, in chapter 97240.305 Section 738.12 generally provides that an income beneficiary is

298. See Ch. 97-240, § 6, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4411 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.303).
299. See FLA. STAT. § 737.303(3) (1997).
300. See Ch. 97-240, § 8, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4413 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
518.112).
301. l
302. See id.
303. See generally Lyman W. Welch, How the Prudent Investor Rule May Affect
Trustees, Ta. & EsT., at 18 (Dec. 1991) (noting that a trustee who decides to delegate has a duty
to exercise reasonable care, skill and caution in selecting agents, and in reviewing the agents
actions).
304. Ch. 97-240, § 8, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4413 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
518.112).
305. Ch. 97-240, § 10, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4422 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
738.12).
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entitled to receive at least a three percent return per year. 306 If the net
income of the trust is less than three percent, the trustee is required to pay
the income beneficiary the three percent out of principal. °7 Prior to the
amendment, a literal reading of the statute required the trustee to distribute
the three percent in addition to the amounts received by the beneficiary
during the course of the year. 30 8 The new amendment clarifies that the
trustee is only required to distribute the difference between three percent and
the income paid to the beneficiary during the course of the year.
Chapter
97-240 also adds a new subsection 738.12(1)(c), which makes the statute
31
applicable only to mandatory income interests in irrevocable trusts. 0
Accordingly, a beneficiary who is entitled to receive income at the discretion
of the trustee is not entitled to the benefit of the statute.
Many institutions (and probate practitioners) will be surprised to find
that chapter 97-240 added additional requirements for both the personal
representative and the institution holding a safe-deposit box in the name of a
decedent.311 Sections 655.936 and 733.604 of the Florida Statutes were
amended to provide that "[t]he initial opening of any safe-deposit box of the
decedent must be conducted in the presence of an employee of the institution
where the box is located and the personal representative." 312 An inventory of
the contents of the box must be conducted and signed by the employee and
the personal representative. 313 The personal representative has a duty31to
file
4
the safe-deposit box inventory within ten days after the box is opened.
The final and perhaps most important "problem area" addressed by
chapter 97-240 was section 733.817, Florida's tax apportionment section of
the statute.3 15 The legislature made wholesale revisions to this statute
effective as of October 1, 1998 intending to effect a more equitable

306.
307.
308.
309.
738.12).
310.
311.
655.936).
312.
313.
314.
315.
733.817).

FLA. STAT. § 738.12(1)(a) (1997).
Id.
See id.
Ch. 97-240, § 10, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4422 (to be codified at FIA. STAT.

§

See id.
Ch. 97-240, §§ 12, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4423-24 (to be codified at

§

FLA. STAT.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Ch. 97-240, § 9, 1997 Fla. Laws 4404, 4415 (to be codified at FLA.
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apportionment, including the enactment of a detailed definitions intended to
resolve ambiguities. 316
C.

Chapter97-161: ProfessionalGuardians

Unlike the broad spectrum of changes encompassed within chapter 97240, chapter 97-161, also enacted by the legislature in 1997, was directed
specifically to the regulation of professional guardians. 31 7 Section 744.1085
of the Florida Statutes was created to provide that "[e]ach professional
guardian who files a petition for appointment after October 1, 1997, shall
post a blanket fiduciary bond with the clerk of the circuit court in the county
in which the guardian's primary place of business is located. 3 18 This new
requirement does not apply to attorneys in good standing, financial
institutions, or public guardians. 319 Section 744.1085(3) requires that all
professional guardians, other than an attorney, must receive a minimum of
forty hours of instruction and training by October 1, 1998, or within one year
after becoming a professional guardian, whichever occurs later.320 Chapter
97-161 also amended section 744.3135 of the FloridaStatutes to require that
all professional guardians submit to a credit check and a criminal
investigation. Finally, section 744.454 was amended to forbid professional
guardians from borrowing or purchasing property from the ward.
IX. FLORIDA PROBATE AND GUARDIANSHIP RULES

A.

Appeals

In 1996, the Supreme Court of Florida amended two rules of procedure
regarding the appeal of orders entered in probate and guardianship
proceedings. Both of these amendments were effective as of January 1,

316. Id. Because a meaningful discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this
article, the authors suggest that interested practitioners see Pamela 0. Price, Determination of
Beneficiariesand Their Interests,in PRACnCE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 11.40 (1997).
317. 1997 Fla. Laws Ch.97-161.
318. Ch. 97-161, § 2, 1997 Fla. Laws 3048, 3049 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
744.3135).
319. Id.
320. Id at 3048-49.
321. Ch. 97-161, § 5, 1997 Fla. Laws 3048, 3049 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
744.454).
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1997. 31 2 Rule 9.1 10(a)(2) of the FloridaRules of Appellate Procedure was
amended to specifically authorize appeals of "orders entered in probate and
guardianship matters that finally determine a right or obligation of an
interested person as defined in the Florida Probate Code." 323 Prior to this
amendment, jurisdiction for appeals of probate and guardianship matters was
found in Rule 5.100 of the Florida Probate Rules. Probate rule 5.100 was
also amended to delete the majority of its text, leaving the revised rule to
simply read "[a]ll orders and judgments of the court that finally determine a
right or obligation of an interested person may be appealed as provided by
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.11O(a)(2). 324
The impact of these rule changes is minor, and there are several cases
that provide guidance on this topic to the practitioner. The best overview of
these rules and their recent amendments is provided by Estate of Nolan v.
Swindle.n 5
The prerequisites for appellate jurisdiction of probate and guardianship
matters have not changed under amended rule 9.110(a)(2). For a district
court to have jurisdiction to review an order or judgment relating to probate
or guardianship matters, that order or judgment must finally determine a
right or obligation of an interested person. 326 The Swindle court stated that
although the prior version of Probate rule 5.100 "did not expressly limit
appeals to final determinations," case law under that rule recognized such a
restriction. 327 The court in Swindle pointed out that "if there is any
difference concerning the need for finality between the current rule and the
328
former rule, the requirement of finality is stronger under the current rule."
For example, in Larkin v. Pirthauer,329 the fourth district held that an order
disqualifying counsel in a will contest did not finally determine a right or
obligation of an interested person under rule 9.110(a)(2). 330 However, the

322. See In re Amendments to Fla. R. App. P., 685 So. 2d 773, 792 (Fla. 1996),
supersededby rule as stated in Lynn v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2199 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
September 23, 1998); In re Amendments to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1996).
323. Amendments to Fla.R. App. P., 685 So. 2d at 792.
324. Amendments to Fla.Prob. R., 683 So. 2d at 84.
325. 712 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
326. Id. at 422.
327. Id. (citing Tyler v. Huggins, 175 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); In re
Estate of Baker, 327 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1976); and In re Estate of Bierman, 587 So. 2d 1163 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
328. Swindle, 712 So. 2d at 423.
329. 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
330. Id. at 183.
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court noted that orders disqualifying counsel are reviewable by certiorari.33 1
In addition, at least three appellate courts have held that the amendment to
rule 9.110(a)(2) does not affect prior case law holding that one's right to
appeal does not arise until all judicial labor is complete on the issue
appealed as to the appellant.3 32
The Swindle court stressed that the finality of an order, for the purpose
of appellate jurisdiction, is specific to the individual seeking the appeal.333
In other words, the court must determine whether the order finally
determines the issue on appeal as to the appellant. 334 In Swindle, the court
entered an order which authorized a previously appointed administrator ad
litem to file an action to set aside a will based on the undue influence of the
decedent's caretaker. 335 The caretaker appealed. The court dismissed the
appeal and held that, although the order being appealed may have finally
determined a right or obligation of the administrator ad litem, such as to file
a will contest, it did not do so as to the caretaker. 33 6 As to the caretaker, the
order simply allowed the administrator337ad litem to bring a lawsuit which may
or may not be adverse to her interests.
Finally, in Pearson v. Cobb,338 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
addressed the timing of filing an appeal. The Pearson court held that, under
Rule 9.020(h) of the FloridaRules of Appellate Procedure,
a timely motion
339
for rehearing tolled the time to file a notice of appeal.
B.

Other SignificantAmendments

The following changes were also made to the Florida Probate Rules
effective January 1, 1997:340 1) Rule 5.040. Formal Notice. It is now
331. Id. (citing Hilsenroth v. Burstyn, 432 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
332. See Swindle, 712 So. 2d at 423: see also Rehman v. Frye, 692 So. 2d 956, 957 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of Walters, 700 So. 2d 434,436 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

1997).
333. See Swindle, 712 So. 2d at 423.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 422.
336. Id. at423.
337. Id.
338. 701 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
339. Id. at 650. The court went on to note that Rule 5.020(d) of the Florida Probate
Rules authorizes the filing of a motion for rehearing on any order or judgment entered in a
probate proceeding. Id.
340. See In re Amendments to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1996). There were
no changes to the Florida Probate and Guardianship Rules in 1998.
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permissible to serve formal notice by any commercial delivery service which
requires a signed receipt and which is approved by the chief judge of the
judicial circuit in which the proceeding is pending;3 4' 2) Rule 5.041. Service
of Pleadings and Papers. The probate rules now permit service by facsimile.
Note, however, that service by delivery or facsimile after 4:00 p.m., not 5:00
p.m. as provided in Rule 1.080(b) of the FloridaRules of Civil Procedure,is
deemed to have been made on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday; 342 3) Rule 5.180. Waiver and Consent. Rule 5.180 was
amended to include specific fee disclosure requirements found in section
733.6171(9) of the FloridaStatutes, relating to waivers in connection with
the amount and manner of determining compensation; 343 4) Rule 5.210.
Probate of Wills. Rule 5.210(a)(4) was amended to delete the requirement
that a will be admitted to probate in another state or country in order to have
an authenticated copy of the will admitted in Florida;344 5) Rule 5.240.
Notice of Administration. A trustee of a trust described in section
733.707(3) of the Florida Statutes is now specifically listed as one of the
persons on whom the personal representative is required to serve Notice of
Administration; 345 6) Rule 5.400. Distribution and Discharge. Rule 5.400
was amended to require that the Petition for Discharge disclose the manner
of determining compensation as required by section 733.6171(9) of the
Florida Statutes;346 7) Rule 5.401. Objection to Petition for Discharge or
Final Accounting. Subsection 5.401(d) was amended to clarify that notice of
the hearing must be served with ninety days of filing the objection. The
actual hearing date can occur after the ninety day period; 347 8) Rule 5.405.
Proceedings to Determine Homestead Real Property. Rule 5.405(c) was
amended to require that an order on a petition to determine homestead
include (i) the description of the real property which is the subject of the
petition, (ii) a determination of whether the real property is homestead, and
(iii) a definition of the specific interests of the persons entitled to the
homestead real property;3 48 9) Rule 5.470. Ancillary Administration. Rule
5.470(c) no longer requires a will to be "probated" in a foreign jurisdiction
before an authenticated copy can be admitted to probate in Florida. This
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. at 79.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Amendments to Fla. Prob. R., 683 So. 2d at 87.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
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amendment addresses situations in which the will was merely deposited or
filed in a foreign jurisdiction but not offered for probate. Failure to offer the
will for probate in the foreign jurisdiction should not prevent its probate in
Florida;349 and 10) Rule 5.560. Petition for Appointment of Guardian of an
The social security number of the alleged
Incapacitated Person:
incapacitated person is no longer required in a Petition for Appointment of a
Guardian. Rule 5.560(b) was also amended to provide that the petition must
be served a reasonable time before the hearing on the petition.
X. CONCLUSION

As evidenced by this survey, lawyers practicing in the area of probate
and trust law must remain current on a wide variety of topics. Hopefully,
this survey will assist practitioners in their efforts to keep abreast of the
latest changes in the law.

349. Id. at 104.
350. Amendnents to Fla.Prob.R., 683 So. 2d. at 106.
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